Category Archives: Linking Thinking

Linking to what others are thinking about learning as a way to explore how we learn online.

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Dawn of the Picasso Fish

Carl Zim­mer gives a typ­i­cally fas­ci­nat­ing account of the evo­lu­tion of our under­stand­ing of how the flat­fish came to have two eyes on one side of its head, an evo­lu­tion­ary conun­drum that engaged both Charles Dar­win and his crit­ics. Dar­win argued that the trait evolved over many gen­er­a­tions of flat­fish; how­ever there was no evi­dence for this mor­pho­log­i­cal devel­op­ment in the fos­sil record.The most recent con­tri­bu­tion to the story is evo­lu­tion­ary biol­o­gist Matt Friedman’s dis­cov­ery of three exam­ples of tran­si­tional forms of flat­fish among the dusty fos­sil col­lec­tions of Europe. What is most inter­est­ing to me is that these fos­sils were long ago col­lected and curated, but so clearly sat­isfy the require­ment of a Dar­win­ian inter­me­di­ate. Matt Fried­man explains:

I sup­pose there is a gen­eral per­cep­tion that museum col­lec­tions are dusty, sta­tic archives, and that every­thing in them has been care­fully stud­ied and pre­cisely iden­ti­fied. But the truth is that they are much more than just long-term stor­age, because as our inter­pre­tive frame­work matures, we can begin to make sense of spec­i­mens that evaded or baf­fled ear­lier gen­er­a­tions of researchers, or draw new con­clu­sions about mate­ri­als we mis­tak­enly thought we had fig­ured out ages ago.

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The Sky Is Falling

The odds that a poten­tially dev­as­tat­ing space rock will hit Earth this cen­tury may be as high as one in 10. Gregg East­er­brook explores why NASA isn’t try­ing harder to pre­vent cat­a­stro­phe, and in doing so offers insight into why our insti­tu­tions learn so slowly. Con­ven­tional think­ing – that the remain­ing space rocks are few, and that encoun­ters with plan­ets were con­fined to our pre­his­toric past – has been eclipsed by more dan­ger­ous real­i­ties, but serve to sup­port NASA’s pre­oc­cu­pa­tion with build­ing a manned moon base.

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The Crowd Within

Psy­chol­o­gists reveal in a study pub­lished in Psy­cho­log­i­cal Sci­ence a corol­lary of the wis­dom of crowds: the aver­age of two guesses made by the same per­son at dif­fer­ent times are bet­ter than either guess on its own. The accu­racy of the sec­ond guesses improves when it is made three weeks rather than imme­di­ately after the first. If a guess by def­i­n­i­tion is the best pos­si­ble answer, where do these sec­ond guesses come from? The researchers sug­gest that we are con­stantly cre­at­ing hypothe­ses about the world, and check­ing them against real­ity. Sec­ond guesses are refined first guesses that have passed muster.

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2b Or Not 2b?

Rumours of the death of lan­guage by tex­ting have been slightly exag­ger­ated. We will not see a new gen­er­a­tion of adults grow­ing up unable to write proper Eng­lish, says lin­guis­tics pro­fes­sor David Crys­tal:

[On the con­trary], it is merely the lat­est man­i­fes­ta­tion of the human abil­ity to be lin­guis­ti­cally cre­ative and to adapt lan­guage to suit the demands of diverse set­tings.… In tex­ting what we are see­ing, in a small way, is lan­guage in evo­lu­tion. Tex­ting has added a new dimen­sion to lan­guage use, but its long-term impact is neg­li­gi­ble. It is not a disaster.

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Why Judy Can’t Add: Gender Inequality and the Math Gap

The math gen­der gap joins a long list of dif­fer­ences in test scores that were once ascribed to biol­ogy, but now appear to be influ­enced by social and cul­tural fac­tors. John Tim­mer sum­ma­rizes a study pub­lished in Sci­ence that sug­gests that the gen­der gap in math scores dis­ap­pears in coun­tries with a more gender-equal cul­ture like Swe­den and Iceland.

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Your Brain Lies To You

Eigh­teen per­cent of Amer­i­cans think the sun revolves around the earth. False beliefs are every­where, and efforts to dis­pel mis­in­for­ma­tion are more dif­fi­cult than one would expect because of quirky way our brains store mem­o­ries and con­tinue to mis­lead us. Sam Wang explains how your brain lies to you.

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Why the Cloud Cannot Obscure the Scientific Method

There is lit­tle rea­son not to be enthused over the new avenues of research offered by increas­ingly com­pre­hen­sive and elec­tronic sci­en­tific data sets avail­able to us. But reac­tions to Chris Anderson’s naive claim that the del­uge of data makes the sci­en­tific method obso­lete reminds us why mod­els and the­o­ries are the best tools we have to under­stand­ing our world. For exam­ple, John Tim­mer responds: “Cor­re­la­tions are a way of catch­ing a scientist’s atten­tion, but the mod­els and mech­a­nisms that explain them are how we make the pre­dic­tions that not only advance sci­ence, but gen­er­ate prac­ti­cal applications.”

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Nobody’s A Critic

Crit­i­cism, laments Mar­tin Meis, no longer defines what is good and bad in cul­ture, and he blames new media. “Basi­cally, cul­ture has been democ­ra­tized. It has been flat­tened out and mul­ti­plied. There are no longer real dis­tinc­tions between high and low. There’s just more.” What he laments is not so much the demise of crit­i­cism per se, which is actu­ally quite robust, but rather the demise of the influ­ence of pro­fes­sional crit­ics and the sanc­tity of their domain. But if the rela­tion­ship between ama­teur and pro­fes­sional critic has flat­tened, so too has the rela­tion­ship between critic and artist. Par­tic­i­pa­tion is a two-way street. Mar­tin Weis on the per­sonal impact made by lit­er­ary critic James Wood’s essay, “What Chekhov Meant By Life”:

Or, to put it another way, Chekhov is more Chekhov when you add James Wood. I pre­fer Wood/Chekhov to Chekhov/Chekhov and I sus­pect that there is sim­ply no such thing as the old Chekhov after Wood got to him. By the same token, Wood is the critic that he is in no small mea­sure because of how he was affected and trans­formed by read­ing Chekhov.

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The Itch

Sci­en­tists once saw itch­ing as a form of pain. They now believe it to be a dif­fer­ent order of sen­sa­tion, one which sug­gests that per­cep­tion is more than mere recep­tion. Per­cep­tion is infer­ence. Atul Gawande explains the “brain’s best guess” the­ory of per­cep­tion:

Per­cep­tion is the brain’s best guess about what is hap­pen­ing in the out­side world. The mind inte­grates scat­tered, weak, rudi­men­tary sig­nals from a vari­ety of sen­sory chan­nels, infor­ma­tion from past expe­ri­ences, and hard-wired processes, and pro­duces a sen­sory expe­ri­ence full of brain-provided color, sound, tex­ture, and meaning.

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Is Google Making Us Stupid

Con­trary to the title of this arti­cle, Nicholas Carr isn’t so much ask­ing if Google is mak­ing us stu­pid, but rather if Google mak­ing us think dif­fer­ently. The answer to this ques­tion is yes, and it echoes ear­lier sen­ti­ments by Neil Post­man who pointed out (about tele­vi­sion) that tech­nol­ogy is not neutral:

Then again, the Net isn’t the alpha­bet, and although it may replace the print­ing press, it pro­duces some­thing alto­gether dif­fer­ent. The kind of deep read­ing that a sequence of printed pages pro­motes is valu­able not just for the knowl­edge we acquire from the author’s words but for the intel­lec­tual vibra­tions those words set off within our own minds. In the quiet spaces opened up by the sus­tained, undis­tracted read­ing of a book, or by any other act of con­tem­pla­tion, for that mat­ter, we make our own asso­ci­a­tions, draw our own infer­ences and analo­gies, fos­ter our own ideas. Deep read­ing, as Maryanne Wolf argues, is indis­tin­guish­able from deep thinking.

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